ADR-17: Wearable Collection Approval And Economics

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Context and Problem Statement

Decentraland Wearables are a key aspect of the experience. The ability to customize your experience with different wearables and the ability for content creators to come and contribute to the look and feel of Decentraland avatars is key for decentralization.

We currently have a need to add an anti-spam mechanism to the flow; given that the previous designs were not intended to run on L2 and the Ethereum Gas Fees was a high enough barrier to entry.

Considered Aspects for Approvals & Burning

Aspect A: Approval by committee members

The first aspect considered in this proposal is the establishment of a committee of community members with the technical knowledge required to detect and prevent issues with the wearabless anyone creates. These issues include:

Details on the Committee mechanics

Questions from the meeting (and their answer):

Roles, Contracts, Capabilities (without considering L1/L2 bridges):





Approver's Committee


 Set Members (Add, Remove)


Committee Members


 has N


Collections Owner/Manager


 can approve/reject


  owned by


Collection Contract


 can reject       


Collection Factory


  is deployer of


 owned by


Content Creator


 can deploy new contracts

This graph is illustrative and can vary

Aspect B: Paying MANA to get reviewed

Because the Collection Manager and Factory is going to live in L2, the cost to create a large number of collections and send them for approval might be too cheap relative to the cost of the committee to review and make a decision on approving/rejecting these collections.

Thus, we add a demand for content creators to pay the DAO a fee (maybe in the order of magnitude of 1000 MANA) before any committee member can reject it.


The fee is decided in base of the amount of items in the collection. It may not be affected by the rarity.

Sequence Diagram: Manual approval of a collection

  Content Creator ->> Content Manager: Submit Collection\n(pays X MANA per item)
  Committee Member ->> Content Manager: Approve
  Content Manager ->> Marketplace: Enable Collection

Sequence diagram: Rejection and eventual approval of a collection

  Content Creator ->> Content Manager: Submit Collection\n(pay X MANA per item)
  Committee Member ->> Content Manager: Reject
  Content Creator ->> Content Creator: Modify items
  Content Creator ->> Content Manager: Re-submit
  Committee Member ->> Content Manager: Approve
  Content Manager ->> Marketplace: Enable Collection

Aspect C: Staking MANA to issue items

With the goal of managing items that might become uninteresting over time, or maybe invalid as the platform evolves, this aspect allows owners of an NFT to recover some MANA by burning the items.

Questions of the meeting:

Aspect D: Economic Incentives

This proposal has some bad incentives for creators that might not be able to meet the financial requirements to submit a collection. Given that they already have skin in the game because of their dedication and technical work provided, we need some way to re-encourage participation for the issuance of items.

Alternative: Grants

Content creators might submit a proposal to the DAO/Forum requesting for a "Grant to create a collection". Thus, the creator can receive an amount of MANA as a grant that allows them to create a collection, add items to it, and go through the approval process without the financial burden imposed by the submission fees and staking required.

Alternative: Licenses

allowances on-chain for Ethereum addresses to deploy a collection (1 licence = 1 collection).

This way, the community or the committe will decide beforehand.

Decision Outcome Per Aspect

Open Questions



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